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{1} The company that controls the interface of the next major operating system will have the ability to set the
standards for application software.[1] It was not surprising that Apple Corporation began its fight to stop
Windows from being that major operating system[2] after Microsoft Corporation introduced the various
versions of its Windows software[3] and announced plans for this program to replace the already widely
selling DOS operating system. Unfortunately, Apple chose to conduct this war on the complex and often
confusing battleground of copyright law, which ultimately proved to be its downfall.[4]
I. Copyright Laws and Computers
{2} The basic purpose of copyright law is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
[5] The idea is to benefit the public by encouraging individual effort through the enhancement of personal
gain.[6] Typically, copyright protection is awarded to literary work, and Congress has included the code that
makes up a computer program in this category.[7] Additionally, some non-literal expression is protected. For
example, not only are the actual words in an author's copyrighted novel protected, but the structure and plot
may be protected as well.[8] The debate[9] in the area of computer science is whether, by analogy, this means
that the result, output, organization or display (the "look and feel") of a computer program might be protected
as well, even if the source code is different.[10] This is to be distinguished from the idea underlying the
program, which is not subject to copyright protection.[11]
{3} To establish copyright infringement, the plaintiff must prove ownership of a valid and existing copyright
and copying by the defendant.[12] This copying can be inferred from circumstantial evidence.[13] Usually
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had access to the plaintiff's copyrighted work and that there is a
"substantial similarity" between the two works.[14] If the plaintiff is arguing for the protection of the "total
concept and feel" of the product, but the discrete elements that make up the whole are not individually
copyrightable or protectable, then only virtually identical copying is barred.[15]
{4} As will be shown below, Apple advocated a substantial similarity standard to protect its interface.
However, because the interface was composed of elements not protected by copyright law, this position
would prove to be Apple's downfall.
 
A. The Substantial Similarity Standard
{5} The substantial similarity standard is the most common test applied in copyright infringement actions.
This standard states that there must be substantial similarity not only of the general ideas of a work, but in the
expression of those ideas as well.[16] This test is usually applied in a two-step process. The first part is
sometimes called the extrinsic test, and is a comparison of specific criteria which can be listed and analyzed.
[17] This requires analytic dissection and may often be decided as a matter of law.[18] The second part of the
test is sometimes called the intrinsic test. This is a comparison based on the "response of the ordinary
reasonable person" to the similarity between the two works.[19]
{6} Broken into these two branches, the standard of substantial similarity is still subject to varied
interpretation and judicial discretion. As Judge Learned Hand said, "[N]o principle can be stated as to when
an imitator has gone beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore
inevitably be ad hoc."[20] Despite the ambiguous nature of this test, it is obvious that it does not require
anything close to exact copying in order to find copyright infringement.
 
B. The Virtual Identity Standard
{7} This standard is defined less clearly than the substantial similarity standard. The Ninth Circuit has stated
that "even similarity in expression is noninfringing when the nature of the creation makes similarity
necessary."[21] When an idea can only be expressed in a limited number of ways, or the expression of the
idea is so intermingled with the idea itself as to become merged, to grant protection of the resulting
expression to one party would be to confer a monopoly on that idea.[22] Since copyright protection is
supposed to extend only to the expression of ideas and not to the idea itself, courts try to avoid this result.
Therefore, only virtually identical copies would be considered violations.[23]
{8} What is meant by virtually identical is not entirely clear. The courts have also used the word identical
alone.[24] Since the standard is most often expressed with the modifier "virtually," we can assume that the
two works need not be exactly alike in every respect. Finally, for purposes of understanding this case, we
must recognize that the virtual identity standard is much more stringent than the substantial similarity
standard.[25]
II. The Case
 
A. Background
{9} The Xerox Corporation first developed a graphical user interface ("GUI") during the 1970s.[26] Xerox
decided not to market the product but did demonstrate it for representatives of Apple in 1979.[27] Apple,
which was building computers based on a faster, more powerful processor chip, developed the new interface
for their Lisa and Macintosh personal computer lines to make the computers more user-friendly.[28] When
Intel Corporation, the manufacturer of the processor on which the DOS-based systems were running,
developed new chips also capable of running a GUI,[29] Microsoft announced plans to develop Windows.
[30] The announcement came in late 1983, but Windows version 1.0 was not shipped until 1985.[31] This
early version was slow, but when version 2.0 was released in 1987, Windows began to seriously challenge
Apple in this area.[32]
 
1. The Facts
{10} In 1985, Apple and Microsoft entered into a secret agreement.[33] This agreement granted Microsoft a
license to use the windows and icons in the development of version 1.0.[34] In exchange, Microsoft agreed to
develop software for the Macintosh platform.[35]
{11} The agreement held until Microsoft released Windows version 2.03, which was described by Apple as
being more "Mac-like,"[36] Apple filed this law suit against Microsoft and its sub-licensee Hewlett-Packard
claiming that their products infringed on Apple's copyrights in the presentation and control of on-screen
information.[37]
{12} An extensive series of motions and refilings followed. By the time the case reached the Ninth Circuit,
the lower courts had found for Microsoft on the central issue of copyright infringement. The basis of this
decision was that the appropriate standard to apply was virtual identity. Apple did not argue that the two
works were virtually identical. Rather, they argued that the appropriate standard to protect "look and feel"
works is substantial similarity.[38]
 
2. "Look and Feel" Protection
{13} Although this expression has become common due to high profile litigation in this area,[39] the
protection of the "look and feel" of software is a relatively new area of the law.[40] There are, however, a few
sources of authority that show the development of this doctrine. At the end of the spectrum offering the most
protection for the plaintiff's work there is Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc.[41] The two
computer programs in this case were written in different programming languages,[42] so there was no
copying of code. The similarities were found exclusively in structure, function and output.[43] The Third
Circuit applied common law principles and determined that with access and substantial similarity there was
copyright infringement, notwithstanding the fact that there was more than one way to express the idea
involved.[44] This reasoning is consistent with Apple's argument, as it looks for substantial similarity in the
work as a whole, rather than dissecting it into its component parts first. Unfortunately for Apple, this area of
law continued to evolve.
{14} At the other end of the spectrum is Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. [45] decided six years later.
In this case, an employee of Computer Associates took code with him when he left to begin work at Altai.
[46] After this was discovered, Altai began reprogramming the product in question using engineers
completely unfamiliar with the copied code.[47] This left only the non-literal program structure to be
protected.[48] The Altai court rejected the Whelan approach,[49] designing instead a three-part test. This test
called for the abstraction of the various layers of program structure, filtration of unprotectable elements, and a
comparison of the remaining protected elements with those of the infringing product.[50] The court held that
this dissection process (popularly known as the "abstraction-filtration-comparison" test) was necessary to
preserve "certain fundamentals of copyright doctrine."[51] It is this approach that Apple fought against. It is
this spectrum of analysis along which the Apple court's decision must lie.
 
B. The Decision
1. The Contract Claim
{15} The Court of Appeals first held that the license agreement covered Microsoft's right to use display
elements and was not, as Apple argued, a license for only the version 1.0 interface.[52] In the agreement,
Microsoft acknowledged that the "visual displays" used in Windows 1.0 were "derivative works of the visual
displays generated by Apple's Lisa and Macintosh graphic user interface programs."[53] The agreement
licensed the use of "these derivative works"[54] to Microsoft. As such, the agreement was written to license
the visual displays as derivative works for use in the interface and not to license the interface itself.[55]
{16} In an earlier draft of the agreement, Apple attempted to limit the license to version 1.0 as a whole.
Microsoft removed this provision from the agreement, and Apple agreed to the final draft which ommitted
this language.[56] As a result, the parties agreed to license only the individual elements. Since the agreement
contained an integration clause which precluded contradiction of its terms by collateral understandings, all
further arguments concerning extrinsic evidence were ineffective.[57]
{17} For these reasons, the court held that the licensing agreement prevented Apple from maintaining a
copyright infringement action for those specific elements covered by the license. Accordingly, the court
identified which elements of the screen displays were licensed and which were not.[58] The court then
dissected the remaining elements to determine which fit into limiting categories in order to distinguish
expression from ideas.[59] The goal was to prohibit broad copyright protection for those elements which
flowed naturally from basic ideas, those which were expressed in one of only a few possible ways (given the
constraints of the computer environment), or those which lacked originality.
 
2. Merger
{18} The doctrine of merger is based on the difficulty that sometimes exists in separating the idea from its
expression.[60] Recall that only the expression and not the idea itself is subject to copyright protection.[61]
In cases where this distinction between idea and expression is difficult, if not impossible, to make, the
expression will only be protected from virtually identical copying. This limited protection prevents granting
to the copyright holder a virtual monopoly over the underlying idea.[62] "For example, in this case, the idea
of an icon in a desktop metaphor representing a document stored in a computer program can only be
expressed in so many ways. An iconic image shaped like a page is an obvious choice."[63]
 
3. Scenes à Faire
{19} Due to the functional purpose of a GUI, the constraints of the hardware and the limited number of ways
to express certain ideas, the scenes à faire doctrine further limits copyright protection.[64] When features of a
program are "indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given [idea]," they are treated as if they
were in fact ideas.[65] Furthermore, the expression of these ideas is only protected from virtually identical
copying.[66] In the case of a GUI, a programmer designing a windowing system like the ones in dispute has
only two options for displaying multiple windows at the same time: either tile them or have them overlap.
Due to this constraint and the fact that overlapping windows have been the preferred choice of users in these
interfaces, the court determined that the use of overlapping windows would not be subject to substantial
similarity analysis.[67]
 
4. The Feist Originality Doctrine
{20} In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv.,[68] the Supreme Court held that the Constitution extends
copyright protection only to those elements of a compilation that are original to the author.[69] Rural
Telephone claimed a copyright in their telephone book. When Feist Publications appropriated portions of
Rural's listings, Rural sued Feist for copyright infringement.[70] The Supreme Court agreed with Feist by
holding that Rural's book was not the subject matter of copyright.[71] The fact that one company took the
time to compile and alphabetize telephone lists did not automatically entitle them to copyright protection for
the work. Rather, there must be some creativity or originality involved, such as a novel or unusual
categorization or selection.[72] Since alphabetical listing is not novel, it is not protectable.[73]
{21} The Apple court extended this doctrine to apply to any dissectable whole, rather than mere fact
compilations and databases.[74] The court rejected Apple's contention that, in looking for originality, the
court should look to the work as a whole.[75] Relying on Feist, the court looked only for elements of the
work original to the author.[76] Considering that Apple admitted to borrowing heavily from Xerox Star and a
research report from IBM Pictureworld, the court did not find the originality that Feist requires.[77]
 
5. The Result
{22} The court held that virtually all the elements identified as similar by Apple fell into one of the limiting
categories, and therefore was either not subject to broad protection or not copyrightable at all.[78] The only
other basis for protection left to Apple was to compare the compilation and arrangement of these elements.
[79] As stated above, when comparing the over-all "look and feel" of a product, if the discrete elements
making up that product are not protectable or copyrightable, the appropriate standard is virtual identity, rather
than the substantial similarity standard for which Apple argued. Apple did not oppose Microsoft's summary
judgment motion, as Apple's only remaining argument was that the environments were virtually identical.
Since this was not a sound argument, Apple chose not to make it. Therefore, when the Court of Appeals
applied the same standard, Apple necessarily lost.[80]
III. Analysis - Choice of Standards
{23} At first glance, it may appear that the court in Apple chose between two standards. The court itself refers
to placing the case on the continuum that was created from the earlier decisions.[81] However, a careful
reading reveals no such choice.
{24} Apple had licensed certain elements of its program to Microsoft. These elements were therefore not
subject to copyright protection. For this reason it was proper, even necessary, for the court to dissect the
program to determine which elements were protectable and which were not. This left the court without any
real options in choosing a standard. Since the discrete elements making up the whole were not subject to
protection, the whole could only be protected from virtually identical copying. To hold otherwise would
extend protection beyond what copyright was designed to protect.
{25} Apple argued that the court should have compared the "look and feel" of the products before dividing
the program into discrete elements.[82] If the case had proceeded more quickly, it is possible that Apple
might have prevailed. However, by the time this case was decided, copyright law had evolved to work against
Apple.[83] Accordingly, the court applied the correct standard - virtual identity.
IV. Conclusion
{26} To put this case into perspective, it might be useful to look at the computer and software industries to
understand what was truly at issue. Some authorities state that it has become clear "that some type of
Windows-like desktop metaphor will dominate the present and next generation of personal computers and
work stations."[84] Microsoft has taken away a large part of Apple's edge, and Apple would like it back.[85]
It is important to recognize that this litigation had far-reaching affects on both companies' plans for the future.
[86] The winner was destined to gain more influence in setting the standards for future developments.[87]
{27} There is also the matter of product identification. For example,
[a]n employee on the way back to his office [who] glances at the illuminated screen of a nearby
computer . . . sees a small trash can in the lower right corner; graphics of labeled file folders,
documents and applications in the center, and a strip of words across the top of the screen . . .
[would] immediately assume that the computer is an Apple Macintosh.[88]
{28} It is this kind of recognition that the developers are trying to protect. As this case demonstrated,
copyright protection does not effectively achieve this goal.[89]
{29} It is not difficult or unreasonable to conclude that Microsoft borrowed ideas from Apple to design its
program. The similarities are present for individual judgment. But it is not enough to show that Microsoft
copied Apple. It must also be shown that Apple had a right to the exclusive use of those elements. As this
case demonstrates, this is not an easy standard to meet. With the addition of the stringent virtual identity
standard, it is unlikely that the courts and copyright law will provide much protection for future "look and
feel" plaintiffs.
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